RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN OPTICAL SCAN BALLOT
PRECINCT COUNT SYSTEM:

Election Protection Efforts

1) Carefully manage ballot design for clarity and functionality.
2) Make sure that all vendor access to voting technology is carefully constrained and documented during any legally constrained period prior to and including Election Day and post election period that contest or legal challenges may be filed by interested parties.
3) Allow no uncertified changes to software installed on Precinct-count ballot readers or central tabulating systems.
4) Any wireless technology associated with any electronic voting technology should be disabled.
5) Review Multilanguage ballot formats prior to Election Day.
6) A documented chain of custody should be maintained for each packet of optical scan ballots, ballot marking items, and Precinct-count ballot readers on and before Election Day to establish who has had contact with these items.
7) Make sure that precinct tabulators and central count tabulators can read ballots marked, which should include a dark stroke crossing the voting target on its long dimension and half the width of the target should register as a vote.
8) Each polling location should have an optical ballot tabulator. The ballot reader should have its setting to detect overvotes turned on at the central county facility prior to being sent to polling locations.
9) Make sure that procedures are in place to deal with precinct scanner failures, which should include instructions to poll workers on how to use the emergency ballot box compartments to hold ballots in the event of a scanner failure.
10) Make sure that procedures are in place at the central tabulator facility to sort out ballots that register overvotes or no votes to check for discernable ballot markings by hand counting them.
11) Each ballot reader and package of optical scan ballots should have physical tamper detection measures applied to them.
12) Documented minimum of at least 3 hours of training for each poll worker.
13) Poll Observer at each polling location with technical training.
14) Prepare incident report mechanism to allow the documentation of technical problems, which are reported by voters or poll workers. These reports should be sent to the US Election Assistance Commission for further evaluation and study.

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15) Report the total number of optical scan ballots, federal and local provisional ballots provided to each polling location.

16) Make sure a report on the total number of voters who visit each polling location on Election Day, along with the total number of votes cast for each candidate or question on the ballot, the number of under votes, overvotes, and no votes registered by race is immediately posted in a visible place outside of the polling location at the end of the election so that any voter can see the results for that polling location and/or precinct.

17) Check the total number of unused and used ballots, ballot marking items, and Precinct-count ballot readers are returned from each polling location at the end of the election and compare this information with what was sent to each polling/precinct location.